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I.

INTRODUCTION

Impaired driving accidents are responsible for thousands of
deaths each year—on average one every fifty-three minutes.1 In
† J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2018; B.S. Sociology,
University of Minnesota, 2013.
1. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (citing NHTSA,
TRAFFIC
SAFETY
FACTS:
ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED
DRIVING
(2015),
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addition to the toll on human life, impaired driving arrests place an
enormous burden on our criminal justice system: law enforcement
carried out more than 1.1 million arrests for driving-while-impaired
(DWI) in 2014.2 To help enforce DWI laws, every state in the country
has “implied consent” laws that require drivers to undergo testing
when there is sufficient reason to believe that they are impaired.3
These laws have been the subject of significant litigation in recent
years, up to and including the United States Supreme Court.4
The United States Supreme Court recently released its decision
in Birchfield v. North Dakota.5 The Birchfield Court held that
criminalizing the refusal to take a warrantless breath test incident to
arrest for DWI is constitutional but criminalizing the refusal to take
a blood test under the same circumstances is not.6 The Court left a
significant question unanswered by not ruling on the
constitutionality of criminalizing the refusal to take a warrantless
urine test incident to arrest for DWI, the other common method of
testing allowed by the DWI statutes.7 Only months after the Birchfield
decision was released, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled on this

https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/Publication/812231). Between 2005
and 2014 deaths from alcohol-impaired driving crashes ranged from 13,582 (2005)
to 9865 (2011). Id.
2. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2014: ARRESTS 2 (2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014
/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/persons-arrested/persons-arrested.pdf.
3. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., REPORT NO. DOT HS 811374,
ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY: A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE xxxiii (2011),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/811374.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2160 (analyzing the constitutionality of
breath and blood searches incident to arrest); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552
(2013) (analyzing the constitutionality of warrantless blood searches under the
exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (analyzing the constitutionality of a warrantless
blood search that was used to convict Schmerber of DWI); State v. Bernard, 859
N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 2015) (holding that warrantless breath searches are
constitutionally permissible incident to arrest); State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d 202
(Minn. 2009) (holding that warrantless searches are justified by the “single factor”
exigency of the natural dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream), abrogated in
part by McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552.
5. 136 S. Ct. at 2184.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2168 n.1 (declining to pass judgment on the constitutionality of urine
testing because “urine tests appear to be less common in drunk-driving cases than
breath and blood tests, and none of the cases before us involves one”).
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issue in State v. Thompson.8 The Thompson court held that a
warrantless test of an arrestee’s urine incident to arrest for DWI
constitutes an unconstitutional search and refusing to take such a
test cannot be criminalized.9
To help explain the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in
Thompson, this Note begins with a brief historical overview of the
exclusionary rule as applied to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.10 Next, this Note examines some of the
significant cases that provided the framework for the Thompson
court’s analysis.11 This Note then focuses on Thompson and lays out
the facts and procedural history of the case. Finally, this Note
analyzes the Thompson court’s decision and argues that the court
erred due to incorrectly weighing the interests involved and failing
to give adequate consideration to the purpose of the warrant
requirement. Therefore, this Note encourages the Minnesota
Supreme Court to reconsider its decision in a future case or,
alternatively, encourages the United States Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to address this issue.12
II.

BACKGROUND: IMPORTANT CONCEPTS IN DWI
JURISPRUDENCE

“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . .
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”13
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right of people to be free from “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”14 This generally requires law enforcement
officers to obtain a warrant from a judge or magistrate before
searching or seizing an individual, but there are many exceptions to
this rule.15 This Note first explains what the exclusionary rule is and
8. 886 N.W.2d 224 (2016).
9. Id.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. See State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) (“[W]arrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable unless they fall under an established exception.”).
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provides a brief history of its development before moving on to
describe a number of judicially created exceptions to the rule.
While it is impossible to define exactly what constitutes a search
in every scenario,16 the Supreme Court laid out an important test for
what is protected under the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United
States.17 For the purposes of this Note, the relevant point is that
government collection of samples of a suspect’s blood, breath, or
urine for the purpose of testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs
constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.18
A.

Brief Overview of the Exclusionary Rule

Because the judiciary is charged with interpreting and applying
the law, courts safeguard the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures through a mechanism called the “exclusionary
rule.”19 Under this rule, if police obtain a piece of evidence through
an unconstitutional search, then the evidence may be inadmissible
at trial.20 This rule was created by the Supreme Court to deter the
executive branch—including police and other law enforcement
agencies—from future Fourth Amendment violations.21 This is a vital
enforcement mechanism because law enforcement officers’ jobs
would be unquestionably simpler if they did not have to comply with
16. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (holding that not
only does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home but also in
the “curtilage,” or area immediately around his home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 586 (1980) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473 (1971))
(“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside
a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy for the
contents of the glove box of a vehicle that a person does not possess or own).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The starting point for constitutional protection from
unreasonable searches is a “reasonable” or “legitimate” expectation of privacy on
the part of the person being searched. Id. at 354–56.
18. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)
(rejecting the government’s claim that searches of blood, breath, and urine did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment).
19. See State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012) (“Evidence resulting
from an unreasonable seizure must be excluded.”).
20. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016); see also State v. Ture, 632
N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001) (“The state bears the burden of establishing an
exception to the warrant requirement.”).
21. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (noting that the
exclusionary rule was created by the Court in order to “compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty”); see also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011).
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the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches.22 Further, because law enforcement officers are not
directly under the control of the judicial branch, the judiciary has
no power to sanction them directly for Fourth Amendment
violations.23 Thus, if courts are to protect Fourth Amendment rights,
they can only do so indirectly after a violation has occurred.
Interestingly, prior to the creation of the exclusionary rule, the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures was defended through tort suits or self-help.24 In the late
eighteenth century, it was not illegal for a person to forcibly resist a
police officer’s unjustifiable search.25 An officer’s intrusion on a
person’s Fourth Amendment rights constituted trespass, and the
officer could theoretically be held personally liable in tort or could
even face criminal charges.26 Though it seems doubtful that such
actions were common, they did arise from time to time.27

22. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (“The investigation of crime
would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth
Amendment reflects the view . . . that the privacy of a person’s home and property
may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of
the criminal law.”).
23. See Ruth W. Grant, The Exclusionary Rule and the Meaning of Separation of
Powers, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 173, 175 (1991) (“The separation of executive
from judicial power . . . is a means to enforce constitutional limits on government
action. . . . Executive abuses can be checked by an independent judiciary, because
the action of both branches is required to bring about an individual’s punishment.
If the courts treat the fruits of an unconstitutional search as valid, they allow the
government as a whole to proceed against the individual in violation of the
constitutional limits established by the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating that when
police officers violate the Fourth Amendment but find nothing incriminating, “this
invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical
redress”). While in many cases application of the exclusionary rule will allow guilty
persons to go free, it is arguably the only practical method of enforcing Fourth
Amendment rights because “freedom from unreasonable search differs from some
of the other rights of the Constitution in that there is no way the innocent citizen
can invoke advance protection.” Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
24. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 625 (1999).
25. Id. at 624–25.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 643 (1878) (analyzing a trespass claim
against an individual tax collector for “causing the seizure of a quantity of whiskey
belonging to” the plaintiff).
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Relevant Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be very complicated,
especially when facing exceptions to the warrant requirement28 and
exceptions to those exceptions.29 The text of the Fourth
Amendment is useful to anchor the analysis of the judicial doctrine.
The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.30
While the warrant requirement for searches and seizures is
implicit in the language of the Fourth Amendment, long standing
judicial interpretation helps to clarify the analytical structure of the
Fourth Amendment. The “ultimate touchstone” of Fourth
Amendment analysis is reasonableness.31 The reasonableness of a
search requires balancing the individual’s right to personal security
and autonomy against the state’s interest of protecting public
safety.32 Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the
28. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2187 (2016) (holding
that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not
permit warrantless blood tests); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1570 (2013)
(reviewing “several sets of exigent circumstances excusing the need for a warrant”);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (establishing a limited exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement to allow police officers to pat down a suspect
for weapons when they believe the individual is armed and dangerous); see also Davis
v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 248 (2011) (holding that there can be a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in some cases). In cases in which a search is
rendered unconstitutional after the fact through a ruling in a different case, the
court may still allow the unconstitutionally obtained evidence to be used at trial if
the offending officer was relying on binding appellate precedent at the time of the
search. Davis, 564 U.S. at 239–40.
29. See, e.g., People v. Levan, 62 N.Y.2d 139, 146 (1984) (holding that since “the
police themselves cannot by their own conduct create an appearance of exigency,”
the state cannot have evidence gathered in a subsequent warrantless search
admitted at trial under the exigent circumstances exception).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (2006).
32. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (stating that
analysis of the reasonableness of a seizure requires “a balance between the public
interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers”).
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Fourth Amendment.”33 Still, the right to be free from warrantless
searches and seizures has a number of judicially created exceptions
and limitations.34 Three of the most important are searches incident
to arrest, exigent circumstances, and administrative (also known as
inventory) exceptions.
This Note primarily focuses on the search-incident-to-arrest
exception. Under this exception, once an officer has probable
cause35 to believe a suspect has committed a crime and has placed
the suspect under arrest, the officer may conduct a search of the
suspect and the “area within his immediate control.”36 This
exception exists for the dual purpose of officer safety and evidence
preservation.37 Searches incident to arrest are categorically
permitted and do not require a case-by-case analysis of the
reasonableness of the search.38 Because these searches are not
subject to a reasonableness analysis based on the totality of the
circumstances, litigation surrounding searches incident to arrest
typically revolve around the permissible scope of the search.39
Exigent circumstances is another important exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.40 Under this
exception, “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law
33. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
34. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
35. Probable cause cannot be defined with specificity, but it “exists where ‘the
facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
36. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009) (quoting Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
37. See id. at 339.
38. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (citing Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)) (stating that there is a long held “categorical
recognition of the validity of a search incident to lawful arrest”).
39. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016) (holding
that a warrantless breath test is constitutional as a search incident to arrest, but a
warrantless blood test is not); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014)
(holding that when a cell phone is discovered as part of a warrantless search incident
to arrest, the data on that cell phone may not be searched without a warrant); Gant,
556 U.S. at 343 (holding that police officers may search a car as a search incident to
arrest when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment, regardless of whether the officers have reason to believe that
evidence of the crime that was the reason for arrest may be found within the car).
40. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013).
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enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”41 However, if an officer
believes (even in good faith) that the exigencies of a situation
require him or her to take action without the specific approval of a
magistrate and a court later determines that the officer was not
justified in this belief, the court would have to exclude any evidence
seized during the search.42 Unlike the search-incident-to-arrest
exception, the exigency exception cannot be applied categorically
and requires an analysis of the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the search was objectively reasonable.43
The administrative, or inventory, exception is another
categorical exception to the warrant requirement that is similar to,
but distinct from, the search-incident-to-arrest exception.44 Under
this exception, when a suspect is taken back to a jail for processing,
officers may perform a full search of the suspect.45
The rationale behind inventory searches is not always clear. In
one case, the Supreme Court ruled that “an inventory search must
not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence.”46 In other words, such a search exists for
administrative purposes and not for the purpose of discovering
evidence that may be used against a suspect at a later date.47
In a recent case, the Supreme Court appeared to take a slightly
more expansive approach to these administrative purposes, stating
41. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
42. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006).
43. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563 (holding that the natural dissipation of
alcohol from the bloodstream cannot constitute a per se exigency and that the
exigent circumstances exception always requires an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances).
44. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1974 (2013) (upholding a
warrantless collection of DNA to identify suspects after arrest); Florida v. Wells, 495
U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990) (holding that an inventory search of an arrestee’s impounded
vehicle is generally appropriate, but evidence produced by an officer acting on an
individualized suspicion rather than standard practice violated the Fourth
Amendment).
45. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (“[T]he Court has been reluctant to
circumscribe the authority of the police to conduct reasonable booking searches.”).
46. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4.
47. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (“[I]nventory procedures
serve to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure
against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from
danger.”).
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that the DNA tests which served to identify arrestees were
permissible.48 Part of the Court’s reasoning was that the government
has a strong public safety interest in determining if the suspects
whom it has under arrest are connected to any other crimes.49
III. HISTORY: KEY CASES THAT INFLUENCE DWI LITIGATION
Because the stakes are frequently so high in criminal cases,
lower courts are often fortunate to have an abundance of guidance
to analyze difficult issues. In defining the scope of the permissible
bounds of government searches of persons, there are too many truly
important cases for this Note to do justice.50 Instead of trying to cover
every important case, this Part first examines the most significant
cases in which the Court focused on defining the scope of
permissible searches incident to arrest. This Part then examines two
cases dealing with warrantless government testing of persons in a
non-DWI context, before finally examining the two recent DWI cases
that were litigated at the Supreme Court.
A.

Defining the Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest

An early decision that is still very influential in Fourth
Amendment DWI jurisprudence is Schmerber v. California.51 After
Schmerber and a friend drank at a bowling alley, Schmerber got
behind the wheel of his car and crashed into a tree.52 Because of
their injuries, Schmerber and his friend were both taken to a

48. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973. Regardless, because such searches are
constitutional when they are carried out under proper procedures and without the
motive of investigating possible criminal activity, any evidence found during such a
search is admissible at a later trial. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370
n.5 (1976) (“The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon
the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when
no claim is made that the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal
investigations.”).
49. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973 (noting the strong government interest in
accurately identifying arrestees, because “past conduct is essential to an assessment
of the danger [an arrestee] poses to the public”).
50. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2012) (noting that between 1978 and 2012 the United States
Supreme Court ruled on 205 cases involving issues related to government searches
or seizures).
51. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
52. Id. at 758 n.2.
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hospital for treatment.53 Once at the hospital, a police officer
requested that Schmerber submit to a chemical test of his breath so
that officers could test for the presence of alcohol.54 Schmerber
refused to comply with the test.55 After being directed to do so by a
police officer, a physician took a blood sample from Schmerber—
over Schmerber’s continued objections.56 The analysis of his blood
showed that Schmerber was intoxicated beyond the legal limit at the
time of the accident.57
Schmerber was charged with driving while intoxicated.58 The
report from the blood analysis was entered into evidence at a trial.59
Schmerber objected to the introduction of this evidence at trial,
specifically arguing that the report that revealed his intoxication was
the product of a search that violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.60 Despite these objections, Schmerber was
convicted of driving while intoxicated by the State of California, and
both the state court of appeals and supreme court affirmed his
conviction.61 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address his constitutional claims.62
The Court dispatched with Schmerber’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims quickly but examined his Fifth and Fourth
Amendment claims much more closely.63 Schmerber’s argument
that his right to self-incrimination was violated hinged on the idea
that by taking a sample of his blood against his will, Schmerber was
being compelled to provide evidence against himself in a criminal
case in direct violation of the Fifth Amendment.64 While the Court
had previously heard at least one case where a plaintiff claimed that
his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by state action,65
because any such cases occurred prior to the incorporation of the
53. Id.
54. Id. at 765 n.9.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 758–59.
57. Id. at 759.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 759–72.
64. See id. at 760.
65. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 79 (1908) (declining to apply
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to the states).
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Fifth Amendment to the states, this was effectively a matter of first
impression for the Court.66 The Court ruled broadly on this issue:
We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood
and use of the analysis in question in this case did not
involve compulsion to these ends.67
The Court also heard Schmerber’s Fourth Amendment claim
and rejected it based on the same grounds.68 The Court again
treated the claim as an issue of first impression.69 The Court first held
that, although the Fifth Amendment is not implicated by a forced
blood draw, the Fourth Amendment “plainly” is.70 The Court first
discussed the analytical structure behind Fourth Amendment claims
and declared that its ruling must rest on whether the search in this
case “respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of
reasonableness.”71 The Court next quickly examined the general
rationales behind warrantless searches incident to arrest and found
them wanting in Schmerber’s case.72 The Court then discussed the
general rule allowing officers to perform searches without a warrant
under emergency situations and found that the facts in Schmerber’s
particular case justified the warrantless search of his blood.73 Unlike
its holding on the Fifth Amendment issue, the Court ruled narrowly
66. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (“We therefore must now decide whether the
withdrawal of the blood and admission in evidence of the analysis involved in this
case violated petitioner’s [Fifth Amendment] privilege.”).
67. Id.
68. See Briethaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 434 (1957) (holding “that the
generative principles of the Bill of Rights” do not extend the protections of the
Fourth and Fifth amendments to petitioner’s case through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
69. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768 (“[W]e write on a clean slate.”).
70. Id. at 767.
71. Id. at 768.
72. Id. at 769–70. The Court first pointed out that because there was plainly
sufficient probable cause, if the policy rationale behind a search incident to arrest
was implicated, it could simply apply that exception to the general prohibition
against warrantless searches. Id. at 769. However, the general rationale supporting
such searches is to allow police to take reasonable steps to confiscate weapons which
could be used against them and to preserve evidence that would be discovered
during such a search, and neither of those rationales applied to the facts in
Schmerber. See id.
73. Id. at 770–71.
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in regard to Schmerber’s Fourth Amendment argument, holding
that only the “special facts” of the case warranted the officer’s
actions.74
The Court’s holding contained language that confused two very
different exceptions to the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
warrantless searches. The Court held that because of the “special
facts . . . the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in
this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.”75 Under
current jurisprudence, the language about “special facts” would be
construed as a reference to the exigent circumstances exception to
the Fourth Amendment—which resists categorical rules—and
instead focuses on the need for the intrusion and the availability of
a warrant.76 However, the language also justifies the search as
“incident to petitioner’s arrest,” which could indicate that the test
was upheld as a search incident to arrest.77 Searches incident to
arrest are categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement and
where applicable do not require any case-by-case balancing.78
In Chimel v. California,79 the Court continued to grapple with
warrantless searches.80 In that case, police arrested the burglary
74. Id. at 771.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1564 (2013) (holding that
the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment requires a factintensive case-by-case determination as to whether or not a particular search is
justified).
77. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
78. See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016) (holding
that searches incident to arrest are either categorically allowed or prohibited, and
that if they are appropriate, then an officer does not need to make a decision based
on the totality of the circumstances).
79. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
80. The Court grappled with many landmark constitutional criminal
procedure cases during the 1960s and into the 1970s. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966) (holding that evidence obtained from a criminal
defendant through police interrogation without advisement of the suspect’s rights
is inadmissible under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 6 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment protection against the right to selfincrimination to state courts); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(establishing the requirement under the Sixth Amendment that the states must
provide legal counsel for certain criminal defendants who lacked the resources to
acquire counsel themselves); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85, 488
(1963) (holding that both direct and indirect evidence discovered because of an
unconstitutional search must be excluded). See generally Eric J. Miller, The Warren
Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2010). Because
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suspect in his house.81 They had a warrant for Chimel’s arrest but
not a warrant to search the house.82 Over Chimel’s objections, police
searched the entire house as a search incident to arrest and
discovered evidence that was later admitted at his trial.83 The Court
granted certiorari to answer the question of whether that search was
within the scope of a search incident to arrest.84
The State argued that an older case, United States v. Rabinowitz,85
should control the outcome in Chimel.86 In Rabinowitz, federal
officers searched the one-room office that a suspect was arrested in,
as well as the desk, safe, and file cabinets in the office.87 The Court
held that police had “[t]he right ‘to search the place where the arrest
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime.’”88 The Court in Chimel explained that “Rabinowitz ha[d]
come to stand for the proposition . . . that a warrantless search
‘incident to a lawful arrest’ may generally extend to the area that is
considered to be in the ‘possession’ or under the ‘control’ of the
person arrested.”89
The Court pushed back on this expansion of police power and
held that officer safety was the prime justification for the searchincident-to-arrest principle and that the preservation of evidence was
a secondary concern.90 The Court held that it is reasonable for an
officer to search the person of the arrestee to “remove any weapons
that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect
his escape.”91 The Court also held that it is categorically reasonable
to search the area into which “an arrestee might reach in order to

of the vast amount of material specifically addressing implied-consent laws and
searches incident to arrest, Terry stops and other important but not directly related
cases are beyond the scope of this Note. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
81. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753–54.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 754. The district court held that the arrest warrant was invalid due to
a lack of sufficient probable cause but did not exclude the evidence that police
discovered in Chimel’s house, as the officers were acting in good faith. Id. at 754–
55. The Supreme Court declined to address the validity of the arrest. Id. at 755.
84. Id.
85. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
86. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 759.
87. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 59.
88. Id. at 61.
89. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760.
90. Id. at 763.
91. Id. (alteration in original).
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grab a weapon.”92 Because such a search is reasonable, the officer
could also seize any potential evidence discovered during this search
in order to prevent its “concealment or destruction.”93 Because
Chimel’s entire home could not be defined as such an area, the
evidence obtained in the search had to be suppressed, and Chimel’s
conviction reversed.94
The Court again addressed the proper scope of a search
incident to arrest four years later in United States v. Robinson.95 In that
case, the petitioner was stopped based on uncontested probable
cause for a minor traffic offence.96 The arresting officer searched
Robinson and pulled a “crumpled up cigarette package” out of the
left breast pocket of his coat.97 Upon further inspection, the
arresting officer discovered fourteen capsules of heroin in the
cigarette package.98 This heroin was admitted as evidence at trial and
subsequently used to convict Robinson of possession of heroin and
facilitation of concealment of heroin.99 At issue was the fact that at
no point did the arresting officer have any fear or apprehension that
Robinson was armed or dangerous; the search was entirely motivated
by the potential for the preservation of evidence.100
Lacking this justification, the court of appeals excluded the
heroin and held that the search was unreasonable.101 The Supreme
Court reversed and, contrary to the language in Chimel, held that the
preservation of evidence was just as important a justification for the
search-incident-to-arrest exception as officer safety.102 For the first
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 768.
95. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
96. Id. at 220.
97. Id. at 222–23.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 219–20.
100. See id. at 236.
101. See United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(reasoning that the search went beyond the scope of a valid search incident to arrest
because “there was no suggestion that [the arresting officer] believed it to be a
weapon or believed himself to be in danger”), rev’d, 414 U.S. 218.
102. Compare Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 (“The justification or reason for the
authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to
preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial.”), with Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762
(holding that the scope of a search incident to arrest is the area from which an
arrestee might procure a weapon).
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time, the Court also held that a search incident to arrest is
categorically reasonable and requires no justification beyond the
probable cause that is required for a legal arrest.103
Jumping forward forty years, the Court recently granted
certiorari on a case that applied Fourth Amendment principles to a
situation that the founding fathers could never have anticipated. In
Riley v. California,104 the Court addressed two cases in which police
searched an arrestee incident to arrest and discovered information
stored on the arrestee’s cell phone, which was accessed without a
warrant and later used as evidence at trial.105 The Court noted that,
absent historical guidance, it is the Court’s duty to balance “the
degree to which [a search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
[against] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”106 The Court based its holding
on the historical basis for searches incident to arrest generally.107 It
held that data stored in cell phones cannot possibly be used as a
weapon to attack the arresting officer.108 The Court rejected the
argument that accessing the data could allow officers to avoid
collateral danger, because that justification could apply to any
potential warrantless search.109
The Court further held that the preservation of evidence,
though a more compelling interest, was also insufficient justification
to allow these searches incident to arrest.110 The Court held that the
main danger asserted by the State, that a third party could either
wipe the data on the phone or encrypt it remotely, was “distinct”
from reasoning in earlier cases, and the danger was thus
unpersuasive.111
On the other side of the balancing test, the Court concluded
that even though an arrestee had a reduced expectation of privacy
103. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“We do not think the long line of authorities
. . . requires such a case-by-case adjudication.”).
104. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2484 (alteration in original) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
107. See id. at 2485.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 2486.
111. See id. (“We have also been given little reason to believe that either problem
is prevalent. The briefing reveals only a couple of anecdotal examples of remote
wiping triggered by an arrest.”).
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simply due to being arrested, the intrusion into the privacy interests
of the arrestee in the case at hand was still unreasonable.112 The
Court referenced the fact that smart phones are essentially
“minicomputers” that are materially different from the crumpled up
pack of cigarettes in Robinson.113
The State presented an alternative argument that searches of an
arrestee’s cell phone should be permissible when the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe that the phone contains
evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested.114 The State
based the argument on the reasoning of an earlier case, Arizona v.
Gant,115 which created an addition to the search-incident-to-arrest
exception regarding vehicles.116 The Gant Court held that when a
suspect is arrested in a motor vehicle, a search of that vehicle is
constitutional as a search incident to arrest when “it is ‘reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in
the vehicle.’”117
The government argued that there should be a similar addition
for cell phones when there is probable cause to believe that there is
evidence on a seized phone that is relevant to the crime for which
the suspect was arrested.118 The Court rejected this argument,
holding that motor vehicles present “heightened law enforcement
needs” that cell phones do not and that in virtually any situation
where a cell phone was seized incident to arrest an officer could
come up with sufficient probable cause to justify a full search of the
data on the phone.119
112. See id. at 2488.
113. Id. at 2488–89, 2492 (noting the “immense storage capacity” of
smartphones and the “virtually unlimited” potential for collection of private data).
114. Id. at 2492 (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).
115. 556 U.S. 332.
116. Id. at 343.
117. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)).
118. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
119. See id. (“It would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law
enforcement officer who could not come up with several reasons to suppose
evidence of just about any crime could be found on a cell phone.”). The Court also
summarily rejected alternate justifications, holding that restricting the scope of the
search within the data of the cell phone would not provide a meaningful constraint
on officers; that even viewing the call logs would reveal personal information, such
as the identities of the persons that the owner of the cell phone was calling; and that
allowing a search of any data on a cell phone that police would have had the
possibility of finding through a search of an address book or other pre-digital
counterpart would be an unworkable and unjustifiable diminution of privacy. See id.
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The Skinner and King Decisions: Providing a Framework for
Analysis of Warrantless Testing

Unlike most of the cases discussed in this Note, the next
important case to the development of DWI implied-consent law,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,120 was not a criminal case but
a civil one. In that case, the Railway Labor Executives’ Association
challenged certain regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad
Administration.121 The challenged regulations required railroad
companies to take blood and urine tests from employees after major
accidents and authorized railroads to administer breath or urine
tests to employees who violated safety rules.122
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.123 The
railroad employees argued that the potential searches were
unconstitutional because they made certain employees subject to a
mandatory search after a major crash without a warrant or any
individualized suspicion.124 The Court found the privacy interests
involved to be slight, as compared to the “compelling” government
interest in safely regulating the industry.125 The Court therefore
upheld the regulations involving warrantless testing of blood,
breath, and urine as categorically constitutional.126 Skinner is
especially important because, unlike any other Supreme Court case,
the Skinner Court had to balance the reasonableness and intrusion
involved in breath, blood, and urine tests, all in the same case.127

120. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
121. Id. at 612.
122. Id. at 609–12. The Court determined, as a threshold matter, that the
collection of such samples constituted a search that implicated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 614–16. The Court reasoned that even though the search was
performed by private railroad companies, because of the compelled nature of the
testing required and the government interest and involvement in the testing, the
searches implicated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
123. Id. at 619 (“For the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and
seizures, but only those that are unreasonable.”).
124. Id. at 621–22 (noting that warrants supported by individualized suspicion
served to protect citizens from “the random or arbitrary acts of government agents,”
and concluding that such arbitrariness was not a concern in this case).
125. Id. at 628.
126. Id. at 603.
127. See id. at 625–28.
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In 2013, the Court granted certiorari on two cases that wrestled
with significant Fourth Amendment issues.128 In Maryland v. King,129
an arrestee challenged a Maryland law incorporating DNA tests into
standard booking procedures.130 Police arrested King on assault
charges and, as part of routine procedure, took a warrantless DNA
sample via cotton swab from his inner cheek.131 When the sample
was analyzed, King’s DNA was matched to semen that had been
recovered from an unsolved rape that occurred six years prior.132
After King’s conviction for that rape, the Maryland Court of Appeals
ruled that the DNA swab was an unconstitutional search and
reversed.133 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide the question of the statute’s constitutionality.134
The Supreme Court first held that the DNA testing clearly
constituted a search of the person and thus implicated the Fourth
Amendment.135 The Court reasoned that, as an administrative
search, requiring a warrant for the test in this case would be a near
pointless exercise, noting that “in light of the standardized nature of
the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with
administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral
magistrate to evaluate.”136 The Court then engaged in a rigorous
balancing test to evaluate the reasonableness of the search.137 The
Court held that the government interest in correctly identifying the
persons whom it held in custody was compelling for four reasons.138
128. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (holding that a warrantless
DNA swab incident to arrest was constitutional as an inventory search); Missouri v.
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (holding that the natural dissipation of alcohol
from a suspect’s bloodstream did not constitute a per se exigency for purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis).
129. 133 S. Ct. 1958.
130. Id. at 1965 (“As part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses,
[King’s] DNA sample was taken by [buccal swab].”).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 580 (2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1958.
134. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965. While every state has a statute authorizing DNA
collection from convicted felons, Maryland was one of twenty-eight states, in
addition to the federal government, that collected DNA from some or all arrestees
prior to a conviction. Id. at 1968.
135. Id. at 1968–69.
136. Id. at 1970 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622
(1989)).
137. Id. at 1969.
138. Id.
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The Court held that identification by way of DNA analysis was crucial
for the purposes of thwarting attempts by the arrestee to conceal his
identity,139 protecting the safety of officers and existing detainees,140
ensuring that the government can produce individuals for trial,141
and assessing the potential danger that the individual would present
if allowed to be released on bail.142 The Court concluded that these
interests outweighed the privacy interests of the individuals
involved.143 The Court held that arrestees have a diminished
expectation of privacy in all cases144 and further held that the search
was minimal because “[a] gentle rub along the inside of the cheek
does not break the skin, and it ‘involves virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain.’”145
The Court declared that DNA testing had the “unmatched
potential” to serve the government’s interest in identifying the
persons whom it had arrested, which deserved “great weight.”146 It
also specifically noted that the methodology used to identify
individuals using their DNA does not reveal any genetic traits of the
individual.147 The Court further noted that the DNA collection
statute itself limits any further use of the DNA sample obtained from
139. Id. at 1971 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 336
(2012)) (“An ‘arrestee may be carrying a false ID or lie about his identity,’ and
‘criminal history records . . . can be inaccurate or incomplete.’”).
140. Id. at 1972 (analogizing to a visual inspection of new arrestees for gang
tattoos or other markings that would indicate that an individual is particularly
violent).
141. Id. at 1973. The argument appears to be that if an individual knew that he
had committed a previous crime and was arrested for a minor offense, then he
would flee the jurisdiction the moment that he was released on that minor charge.
Id. This begs the question: if such an individual were inclined to flee because he had
committed an unsolved crime, then why would he not have done so before
committing the later minor offense in this hypothetical?
142. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC., § 4-216(f)(1)(G) (West 2013)
(current version at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-216(e)(1)(G) (West 2016)))
(“Knowing that the defendant is wanted for a previous violent crime based on DNA
identification is especially probative of the court’s consideration of ‘the danger of
the defendant to the alleged victim, another person, or the community.’”).
143. Id. at 1980.
144. Id. at 1978 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)) (“The
expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are]
of a diminished scope.’”).
145. Id. at 1979 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
146. Id. at 1977.
147. Id. at 1979 (noting that the CODIS loci tested currently cannot reveal such
information).
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the arrestees.148 Interestingly, the Court accepted at face value the
contention that the DNA samples that the State obtained would not
be used for any purpose other than identification of the arrestee.149
Instead, the Court merely noted that “[i]f in the future police
analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s
predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not
relevant to identity, that case would present additional privacy
concerns not present here.”150 The Court also reasoned that DNA
testing in this context was analogous to the current practice of
fingerprinting suspects upon arrest.151 Justice Scalia wrote a scathing
dissent,152 concluding with a hope that a future Court would reverse
the opinion.153
C.

DWI Litigation Is Back at the Supreme Court

The same year the Court decided Maryland v. King, the Court
took on a case that sparked a flurry of DWI litigation. In Missouri v.
McNeely,154 McNeely was pulled over on suspicion of driving while
impaired after the officer witnessed him driving erratically.155
McNeely failed other field sobriety tests and refused to provide a
breath sample for a preliminary breath test.156 The officer placed
McNeely under arrest and began to transport him back to the
station.157 Once McNeely informed the officer that he would again
refuse to provide a breath sample at the station, the officer diverted

148. Id. at 1980 (quoting NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 136 (2011)) (noting
that “a statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures generally
[assuages] privacy concerns” (internal quotations omitted)). Interestingly, the
Court appears to have taken a step back from this position. Cf. Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 36 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (“Even if the law enforcement agency is
precluded from testing the [retained blood sample] for any purpose other than to
measure BAC, the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the person
tested.”).
149. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1971–72.
152. Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt that the proud men who wrote
the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal
inspection.”).
153. Id. at 1989–90.
154. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
155. Id. at 1556.
156. Id. at 1556–57.
157. Id.
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McNeely to a hospital to obtain a sample of McNeely’s blood.158 At
the hospital, the officer read the informed-consent advisory to
McNeely and informed him that test-refusal would result in license
revocation and be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution.159
McNeely still refused to consent to testing.160 The officer directed a
hospital technician to take a blood sample anyway, which revealed
that McNeely’s blood alcohol concentration was almost twice the
legal limit.161
McNeely was subsequently charged with driving while
intoxicated. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on
the grounds that the blood draw constituted a warrantless search that
was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.162 He argued that the
search could not be justified by the exigent circumstances exception
to the warrant requirement.163 The district court agreed that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment, and the Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed.164 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
issue of whether the natural dissipation of alcohol from the body
constituted a per se exigency so as to justify states in either
conducting warrantless tests or in criminalizing refusal of warrantless
tests.165
The Supreme Court held that the exigent circumstances
exception requires a case-by-case analysis that is dependent on the
totality of the circumstances.166 The Court maintained that it would
not “depart from careful case-by-case assessment of exigency and
adopt the categorical rule proposed by the State.”167 While the Court
cited to several exigent circumstance cases that clearly use such
language,168 there are exceptions to the warrant requirement that

158. Id. at 1557.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1558.
166. Id. at 1563.
167. Id. at 1561.
168. See id. at 1559 (first citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001)
(“concluding that a warrantless seizure of a person to prevent him from returning
to his trailer to destroy hidden contraband was reasonable ‘[i]n the circumstances
of the case before us’”); then citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973)
(“holding that a limited warrantless search of a suspect’s fingernails to preserve
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appear to constitute per se exigencies.169 Further, it appears that for
some cases, the language that the McNeely Court used to describe the
Court’s past reasoning does not necessarily match with the language
used in the actual cases.170 Importantly, the Court’s holding in
McNeely abrogated Minnesota case law upholding the
constitutionality of the State’s implied-consent laws as being justified
by the “single-factor” exigent circumstance of the “rapid, natural
dissipation of alcohol in the blood.”171
In 2016, just three years after McNeely, the Supreme Court again
grappled with the issue of DWI test refusal. In Birchfield v. North
Dakota,172 the Court held that warrantless breath tests were
categorically constitutional incident to a valid arrest for driving while
impaired but warrantless blood tests were not.173 The case involved
three defendants, each with a slightly different set of facts but all of
whom challenged the constitutionality of their states’ impliedconsent laws.174 The issue that the Court granted certiorari on was

evidence that the suspect was trying to rub off was justified ‘[o]n the facts of this
case’”)).
169. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“One exigency
obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously
injured or threatened with such injury.”); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511
(1978) (“[E]ntry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and . . . once in the building,
officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate . . . .”); United States
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (holding that a suspect fleeing from a public area
into her private house did not require the police to halt their chase, as the flight
constituted a “hot pursuit”). This seems to directly contradict the Court’s
description of exigent circumstance jurisprudence in McNeely as always relying on a
case-by-case analysis, as these cases appear to create categorical exigent
circumstances that are exempt from the warrant requirement.
170. Compare McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 (“Our decision in Schmerber applied this
totality of the circumstances approach.”), with Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966) (analyzing the totality of the circumstances to justify the search and holding
that given the special facts, the search “was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s
arrest” (emphasis added)).
171. State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549–50 (Minn. 2008), abrogated by McNeely,
133 S. Ct. 1552.
172. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
173. Id. at 2185.
174. Id. at 2170. Danny Birchfield was convicted of DWI test-refusal in North
Dakota for refusing to consent to a blood test after driving his car off of a highway.
Id. William Bernard was convicted of DWI test-refusal in Minnesota for refusing to
consent to a breath test. Id. at 2171. Steve Beylund had his driver’s license revoked
for DWI in North Dakota after a blood test revealed that he had been driving with
a blood alcohol concentration more than three times the legal limit. Id. at 2171–72.

2017]

STATE V. THOMPSON

947

essentially the same for all three cases: was a warrantless test, of
breath or blood, permissible as a search incident to arrest?175
The Court began its analysis with a general discussion of the
implied warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment before
moving on to the specific issue in the case, the search-incident-toarrest exception.176 The Court went through the historical basis for
the exception before deciding that there was no historical analogue
to chemical tests for blood-alcohol-concentration.177 Therefore it
concluded that, consistent with Riley, the proper analysis for whether
the exception applies in a certain situation should be determined
“by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [a search]
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree
to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”178
In regard to breath tests, the Court reaffirmed its declaration
from Skinner that they “do not ‘implicat[e] significant privacy
concerns.’”179 Its analysis focused primarily on the degree of physical
intrusion into the body that the testing required.180 The Court held
that even though the test requires the suspect to insert the
mouthpiece of the testing machine into his or her mouth, there was
nothing “painful or strange” about the test.181 Importantly, the Court
directly compared the breath search at issue in that case with the
DNA swab in Maryland v. King—despite the fact that the two searches
were justified by different exceptions to the warrant requirement.182
The Court went on to note that breath tests only reveal one
piece of information and do not place a sample of any biological
material in the hands of police.183 Again, it contrasted the testing in

175. Id. at 2172.
176. Id. at 2173 (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)).
177. Id. at 2176.
178. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484
(2014)).
179. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2177. The Court also held that people hold no “possessory interest”
in the air in their lungs, regardless of the fact that the test requires “alveolar,” or
“deep lung” air. Id.
182. Id. (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013)) (describing
“the process of collecting a DNA sample by rubbing a swab on the inside of a
person’s cheek as a ‘negligible’ intrusion”).
183. Id.
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this case with the test in King.184 Finally, the Court noted that breath
tests are not likely to cause an enhancement to the embarrassment
that is already “inherent in any arrest” and that after an arrest, “the
individual’s expectation of privacy is necessarily diminished.”185
To contrast, the Court noted that blood tests are different
because they require “‘piercing the skin’ and extract[ing] a part of
the subject’s body.”186 The decision also included the dramatic point
that “while humans exhale air from their lungs many times per
minute, humans do not continually shed blood.”187 The Court
finished its analysis of the intrusion of blood tests by noting that a
blood test places a sample into the hands of law enforcement.188
On the other hand, the Court stated that the government has a
“paramount interest . . . in preserving the safety of . . . public
highways.”189 The Court described the damage that the country
suffers from drunk driving every year:
Alcohol consumption is a leading cause of traffic fatalities
and injuries. During the past decade, annual fatalities in
drunk-driving accidents ranged from 13,582 deaths in 2005
to 9,865 deaths in 2011. The most recent data report a total
of 9,967 such fatalities in 2014—on average, one death
every 53 minutes. Our cases have long recognized the
“carnage” and “slaughter” caused by drunk drivers.190
The Court noted that, contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s assertion
in her dissent, the State’s interests do not end once the drunk driver
is arrested.191 Instead, the Court stated that the interest continues
through the suspect’s conviction, because the State has an interest
in deterring other potential drunk drivers from getting behind the
wheel.192
The Court also noted that criminal consequences for DWI test
refusal grew out of a desire to curb the “most dangerous
offenders”193—in other words, those who drive with a blood alcohol
184. Id. (citing King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967–68).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2178 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626
(1989)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
190. Id. (internal citations omitted).
191. Id. at 2178–79.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2179.
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content well above the legal limit and DWI recidivists who faced the
harshest consequences for a conviction for driving while impaired.194
The problem with purely civil sanctions for test refusal, the Court
noted, was that the most dangerous offenders had a strong incentive
to refuse a test that would likely lead to harsh criminal penalties
when they could simply refuse to comply with the test and only have
to face a license revocation.195 The Court further reasoned that
requiring a warrant for every driving while impaired arrest was a
practical impossibility, as police effectuate more than 1.1 million
such arrests every year.196
The Court then noted that due to the interests involved and the
categorical nature of the search-incident-to-arrest exception, the
burden was on the petitioners, not the State, to show that there was
a “special need” for warrants in these situations.197 This implies that
the categorical nature of searches incident to arrest have a
presumption of reasonableness. The Court then went through the
possible benefits of requiring a warrant for every arrest on suspicion
of driving while intoxicated, such as limiting intrusion on privacy.198
However, the Court concluded that due to the similarity of the facts
in most DWI arrests and the categorically limited scope of the search,
requiring the police to obtain a warrant for every arrest on suspicion
of DWI “would impose a substantial burden but no commensurate
benefit.”199 Additionally, the Court concluded that given the
government interests involved and the “slight” impact of breath tests
on privacy, warrantless breath tests are categorically constitutional
incident to arrest for DWI.200
The Court reached the opposite conclusion on blood tests.201
The Court held that the reasonableness of the “more intrusive” test
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 2180 (“The number of arrests every year for driving under the
influence is enormous—more than 1.1 million in 2014.”).
197. Id. at 2181.
198. Id. (“First, [warrants] ensure that a search is not carried out unless a neutral
magistrate makes an independent determination that there is probable cause to
believe that evidence will be found. Second, if the magistrate finds probable cause,
the warrant limits the intrusion on privacy by specifying the scope of the search—
that is, the area that can be searched and the items that can be sought.” (internal
citations omitted)).
199. Id. at 2181–82.
200. Id. at 2184.
201. Id.
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“must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive
alternative of a breath test.”202 Further, the Court noted,
Respondents have offered no satisfactory justification for
demanding the more intrusive alternative without a
warrant. . . . [P]olice have other measures at their disposal
when they have reason to believe that a motorist may be
under the influence of some other substance (for example,
if a breath test indicates that a clearly impaired motorist has
little if any alcohol in his blood). Nothing prevents the
police from seeking a warrant for a blood test when there
is sufficient time to do so in the particular circumstances or
from relying on the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement when there is not. . . . Because breath
tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in
most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we
conclude that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be
administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for
drunk driving.203
Thus, the Court relied exclusively on the greater intrusiveness
of blood tests to hold that warrantless blood tests are
unconstitutional as searches incident to arrest, absent a case-by-case
analysis of the exigencies of the situation.
IV. STATE V. THOMPSON
A.

Facts of the Case

On April 13, 2012, at around 1:00 a.m., Ryan Thompson drove
away from a bar in Owatonna, MN.204 An officer, who was watching
the parking lot of this bar, saw Thompson’s car “jump the curb and
then stop quickly before reversing and leaving the parking lot.”205 As
the vehicle left the parking lot, it “cut the corner short and crossed
the center line.”206 The officer watching the parking lot then
initiated a traffic stop.207 After Thompson stopped and the officer
approached his car, Thompson informed the officer that he did not

202. Id.
203. Id. at 2184–85.
204. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886
N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016).
205. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 226.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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have his driver’s license with him and produced the license of the
passenger of the car instead.208 The officer was able to identify
Thompson by his name and date of birth.209 The officer later
testified that there was an “overwhelming odor” of alcohol coming
from the vehicle and that Thompson had “watery and glassy eyes.”210
Thompson admitted to having a single beer.211
The officer then asked Thompson to submit to several field
sobriety tests, all of which he failed.212 Thompson also failed a
preliminary breath test at the scene,213 after which the officer placed
him under arrest for suspicion of driving while impaired.214 The
officer then transported Thompson to the Steele County Detention
Center and gave Thompson a phone, a telephone book, and a
directory of attorneys.215 After leaving one voicemail, Thompson told
the officers that he was done attempting to contact an attorney.216
The officer then read the implied consent advisory to Thompson
and requested that he take a blood or urine test.217 Thompson

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 226–27.
211. Id. at 227.
212. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886
N.W.2d 224.
213. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227. Under Minnesota law, when a peace officer
has reason to believe that a person has driven or operated a vehicle under the
influence of alcohol, the officer may request that the person submit to a
“preliminary screening test,” which tests a sample of the person’s breath at the
scene. MINN. STAT. § 169A.41 (2016). This test will indicate an approximate level of
intoxication, but the results are not considered reliable enough to be evidence of
intoxication. See Windschitl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 355 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Minn.
1984). This test may be used for a number of purposes (primarily to determine
whether or not an arrest should be made), but it cannot be used to establish the
blood alcohol content of the suspect in court during a prosecution for driving while
intoxicated. MINN. STAT. § 169A.41, subdiv. 2.
214. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. Under Minnesota law, officers who arrest a person suspected of driving
under the influence have two choices to offer the arrestee. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51,
subdiv. 3. They can require the suspect to take a breath test, and if they do so, they
are not required to offer, or accept, an alternate test. See Carlson v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 357 N.W.2d 391, 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The other choice is to request
that the suspect take either a blood or urine test. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51, subdiv. 3.
If police request either of these testing methods and the suspect refuses, then police
must offer an alternate method of testing before the state can either bring criminal
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refused both alternatives, stating, “I don’t think I’ve been prosecuted
properly.”218 The State subsequently charged Thompson with one
count each of second-degree test refusal,219 third-degree driving
while impaired,220 obstruction of legal process,221 and driving over
the centerline.222
B.

The Lower Courts’ Decisions and Reasoning

At the district court, Thompson moved for dismissal of the testrefusal charge, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied on the grounds that it violated his substantive due process
rights and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.223 Regarding
the due process claim, he claimed that a warrantless search of his
blood or urine was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth
Amendment that violated his substantive due process right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.224 He argued that because
the search was be unconstitutional, refusing to submit to it could not
be criminalized.225
The unconstitutional conditions argument is more complex.
Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the government
cannot condition a privilege on the relinquishment of certain
constitutional rights.226 In this case, Thompson argued that
Minnesota’s implied-consent laws condition the privilege of driving
on the relinquishment of the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Because both the
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court

charges or revoke the license of the suspect for test refusal. See Johnson v. Comm’r
of Pub. Safety, 887 N.W.2d 281, 290–95 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
218. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886
N.W.2d 224.
219. MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 2, 169A.25.
220. Id. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 1(1), 169A.26.
221. Id. § 609.50, subdivs. 1(2), 2(3).
222. Id. § 169.18, subdiv. 1; Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227.
223. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227.
224. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 876–77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d,
886 N.W.2d 224.
225. Id.
226. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1426 (1989) (“[T]he doctrine serves to protect only those rights that depend on
some sort of exercise of autonomous choice by the rightholder, such as individual
rights to speech, exercise of religion or privacy . . . .”).
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ruled on this case on due process grounds, neither court addressed
Thompson’s unconstitutional conditions argument.227
The district court denied Thompson’s motion for dismissal
based on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Bernard.228 Bernard involved a similar challenge to the DWI testrefusal statute on warrantless tests of a suspect’s breath.229 The
Minnesota Supreme Court held in Bernard that when a suspect is
placed under lawful arrest for suspicion of driving while impaired, a
warrantless breath test is categorically permissible as a search
incident to arrest.230 Thus, because a warrantless breath test under
those circumstances is constitutional, it is also constitutional to
criminalize refusal of the test.231 The Bernard court did not rule on
either urine or blood tests and declined to express any opinion on
the matter.232
The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed with the district
court. The court of appeals found that Bernard was not dispositive on
the issue of blood or urine tests and held that the test-refusal statute
is unconstitutional as applied to both blood and urine.233 Instead of
Bernard, the court of appeals leaned heavily on another opinion that
it had released just two months prior, State v. Trahan.234 In Trahan,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that warrantless blood tests
incident to arrest for driving while intoxicated were
unconstitutional, and therefore the DWI test-refusal statute was
unconstitutional as well.235
Basing its reasoning on Trahan, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held that urine tests are more like blood than breath tests and
therefore are not permissible as searches incident to arrest.236 The

227. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at n.9; Thompson, 873 N.W.2d at 880.
228. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227 (citing State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762
(2015), aff’d sub nom. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016)).
229. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 764.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 768 (“[T]he question of a blood or urine test incident to arrest is not
before us . . . . The differences between a blood test and a breath test are material,
and not the least of those differences is the less-invasive nature of breath testing.”).
233. State v. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 886
N.W.2d 224.
234. Id. at 876 (citing State v. Trahan, 870 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015),
aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016)).
235. Trahan, 870 N.W.2d at 401.
236. Thompson, 873 N.W.2d at 879.
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court reasoned that because warrantless urine tests could not be
justified as searches incident to arrest, the test-refusal statute
implicated Thompson’s substantive due process right to be free from
unreasonable searches, and strict scrutiny was the appropriate
framework for an analysis of the DWI test-refusal statute.237 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the State did have a
compelling interest in keeping impaired drivers off of its roads,
which satisfied the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis.238 But it
held that because there were alternatives available to the State, such
as breath tests, the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.239
Upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court was critical of the
analysis of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The higher court
determined that because a specifically enumerated fundamental
right, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
was implicated, a substantive due process analysis was inappropriate
and contrary to precedent.240 However, while it disagreed with the
reasoning of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the decision and held that a warrantless
urine test was not constitutionally permissible as a search incident to
arrest.241 The court reasoned that while the urine tests are more like
breath tests than blood tests when examined for their level of
intrusiveness, urine tests implicate more privacy interests than
breath tests or blood tests and are thus overall more like blood
tests.242 It also reasoned that because breath tests adequately serve
the State’s interest in protecting the public from the danger of
impaired drivers, the scales are further tipped against the
reasonableness of warrantless urine tests.243

237. Id. at 879–80.
238. Id. at 880.
239. Id.
240. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 230 n.4 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Cty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998)) (“[W]here a particular Amendment
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular
sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”).
241. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 233.
242. Id. at 231–32.
243. Id. at 233.
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V. ANALYSIS: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT GOT IT WRONG
To analyze the court’s decision in Thompson, this Part first begins
with a discussion of the DWI test-refusal statute and what is required
to convict someone under the law. Next, this Part critically examines
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s balancing of privacy interests
against public interests. Finally, this Part discusses the purposes of
the warrant requirement as the United States Supreme Court laid
out in Birchfield and concludes that the Thompson decision does not
serve these purposes.
A.

Understanding the Law

Minnesota’s implied-consent law states that any individual who
“drives, operates, or is in physical control of a motor vehicle within
this state or on any boundary water” consents to a chemical test for
the limited purpose of determining whether or not he or she is
under the influence of intoxicating chemicals.244 A number of
conditions need to be met before an individual is subject to a
chemical test to determine intoxication.245 The officer requesting
the test must have probable cause to place the suspect under arrest
for “driving, operating, or [being] in physical control of a motor
vehicle” while under the influence, and one of the following
conditions must be present:
(1) the person has been lawfully placed under arrest
for violation of section 169A.20 [driving while impaired] or
an ordinance in conformity with it;
(2) the person has been involved in a motor vehicle
accident or collision resulting in property damage,
personal injury, or death;
(3) the person has refused to take the screening test
provided for by section 169A.41 (preliminary screening
test); or
(4) the [preliminary] screening test was administered
and indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.246
244. MINN. STAT. § 169A.51 (2014).
245. All of these conditions are necessary, but not sufficient, before an
individual can be prosecuted for test refusal. See id.
246. Id. § 169A.51, subdiv. 1(b). Additionally, if the person is “driving,
operating, or in physical control” of a commercial motor vehicle, there are no other
requirements, and a chemical test is required simply based on an officer’s
determination of probable cause that the person is under the influence. Id.
§ 169A.51, subdiv. 1(c).
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Under the statute, once these conditions are met, suspects are
obligated to take a chemical test of their breath, blood, or urine,
depending on the officer’s request.247 Only then, if they refuse to
take such a test, could a suspect be prosecuted for DWI test-refusal.248
Further, Birchfield bars the State of Minnesota from prosecuting
individuals for refusing to consent to a blood test incident to arrest
for driving while impaired.249
A key issue in an analysis of the constitutionality of this statute
is the behavior that the statute punishes. This is because the goal of
the statute is one step removed from the behavior that it is
attempting to regulate; that is, individuals driving while under the
influence of alcohol or another intoxicating substance. A conviction
for a DWI test refusal is not a conviction for the act of driving while
impaired, but rather a conviction for refusing a search.250 As such,
courts have correctly focused their inquiry on the constitutionality
of the searches that states have chosen to criminalize refusal of; if the
searches are not constitutional exercises of government authority,
then individuals cannot be punished for refusing to comply with
them.251
B.

The Court Gave Too Much Weight to the Privacy Interests Involved

In order to determine whether a warrantless urine test is a valid
search incident to arrest for driving while intoxicated, the Thompson
court engaged in a balancing of the government interests involved
against the privacy interests implicated by the search.252 The court
first laid out the privacy interests involved in the case: “the level of
physical intrusion” required by the search, “the ability of the State to
retain a sample containing other personal information,” and the

247. See id. § 169A.20, subdiv. 2.
248. See id. §§ 169A.20, subdiv. 2, 169A.51.
249. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (holding that
warrantless blood tests are not constitutional as searches incident to arrest).
250. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.20, subdiv. 2 (“It is a crime for any person to refuse
to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine.”).
251. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172 (“If such warrantless searches comport with
the Fourth Amendment, it follows that a State may criminalize the refusal to comply
with a demand to submit to the required testing, just as a State may make it a crime
for a person to obstruct the execution of a valid search warrant.”).
252. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 230–33 (Minn. 2016).
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“enhanced embarrassment a urine test is likely to cause during an
arrest.”253
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the State on the
level of physical intrusiveness of the search; that is, a urine test is
more like a breath test than a blood test in terms of the physical
intrusion.254 However, the court failed to give appropriate weight to
this aspect of the analysis. In Thompson, the court’s entire analysis on
the matter of the physical intrusiveness of the test consisted of two
paragraphs, acknowledging that a urine test was not physically
intrusive.255 The holding of the case rested on the fact that the other
two privacy interests involved—the embarrassment in the
application of a urine test and the potential misuse of a sample—
outweighed the low level of intrusiveness of the search, so that “[i]n
sum, in terms of the impact on an individual’s privacy, a urine test is
more like a blood test than a breath test.”256
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning misstates the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Birchfield.257 The Court
held in Birchfield that “[b]ecause breath tests are significantly less
intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law
enforcement interests . . . a breath test, but not a blood test, may be
administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk
driving.”258 The Court did not place significant weight on the
possibility that the State could use a retained sample for nefarious
ends or that obtaining the sample could be an uncomfortable
experience for the arrestee.259 When the case is considered in its
entirety it is clear that the Birchfield decision rested on the
intrusiveness of the test, and the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in
failing to weigh this interest appropriately.260
253. Id. at 229–30.
254. Id. (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 232. “[T]he fact that a urine test ‘places in the hands of law
enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is
possible to extract information beyond a simple [alcohol concentration] reading’
makes urine tests comparable to blood tests.” Id. at 231 (quoting Birchfield, 136 S.
Ct. at 2178).
257. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2160.
258. Id. at 2185.
259. Id. There are only two sentences mentioning of the potential misuse of any
retained sample in the Birchfield decision, and they are not central to the holding of
that case. See id. at 2178.
260. See id. at 2185 (“Because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than

958

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:4

The court in Thompson gave far too much weight to the potential
for the abuse of a retained sample from a urine test. The court stated
decisively that “the fact that a urine test ‘places in the hands of law
enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from
which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple [alcohol
concentration] reading’ makes urine tests comparable to blood
tests.”261
Assuming the Thompson court had the freedom to evaluate this
interest independently of United States Supreme Court guidance, it
did so erroneously. The Thompson court considered this interest in
its eventual decision to declare a statute unconstitutional—an action
that Minnesota case law holds should only be done “with extreme
caution and only when absolutely necessary.”262 Instead of declaring
the statute unconstitutional, the court could have placed a limiting
construction on the statue providing that any samples obtained for
the purpose of testing for intoxicating chemicals would have to be
destroyed immediately after testing.263 This would have allowed the
court to uphold the statute as constitutional. Because Minnesota
courts “should interpret a statute to preserve its constitutionality,”
the court erred by failing to consider a limiting construction of the
statute.264
Though the language that the Thompson court used to describe
the potential for embarrassment from the collection of a urine
sample was more restrained, the court also erred in giving this
interest great weight.265 Not long ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court
made clear “that the warrantless inspection of an arrested man’s
blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, we conclude
that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to
a lawful arrest for drunk driving.”).
261. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 231 (quoting Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178).
262. State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2013) (quoting In re Haggerty,
448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989)).
263. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480−81 (2010) (quoting Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)) (stating that the Court may impose a limiting
construction on a statute to preserve its constitutionality if the statute is “readily
susceptible” to such a construction).
264. Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn.
2005); see also MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (2016) (“In ascertaining the intention of the
legislature the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: . . . (3) the
legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this
state . . . .”).
265. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 231 (“Urine tests for law enforcement purposes,
regardless of how they are administered, implicate significant privacy interests.”).
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penis was a valid search incident to arrest, noting that someone
‘lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth
Amendment interest in the privacy of his person.’”266
While the Minnesota Supreme Court does have the power to
overrule its own cases,267 the court lacked support for its reasoning.
The court cited Skinner for the proposition that “urine tests for law
enforcement purposes, regardless of how they are administered,
implicate significant privacy interests.”268 But Skinner does not
support this proposition. The passage that the Thompson court relies
on was the section of the Skinner Court’s explanation of why urine
tests implicated the Fourth Amendment at all—not why they
implicated especially significant privacy interests.269
Further, the Thompson court’s implication that the privacy
interests are significant regardless of the method of collection is
directly contradicted by Skinner. The analysis in that case focused on
the minimally intrusive nature of the procedure used to collect urine
samples.270 This implies that the procedure used to collect samples,
rather than what may be revealed by testing samples, is what
implicates privacy interests.
Finally, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,271 the Supreme
Court addressed a challenge to a school’s policy of subjecting its
student athletes to random tests of their urine for the use of drugs.272
It concluded that these tests constituted Fourth Amendment
searches,273 just as the tests at issue in Thompson. In weighing the
intrusion of the tests involved, the Court reasoned that, like Skinner,
“the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which
266. State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Riley,
303 Minn. 251, 254, 226 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1975)).
267. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 2010) (reasoning that
although the Minnesota Supreme Court has the power to overrule its own decisions,
the doctrine of stare decisis requires a compelling reason to do so).
268. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)).
269. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (“Because it is clear that the collection and
testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long
recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded
unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under
the Fourth Amendment.”).
270. Id. at 626 (holding in part that because the regulations do not require the
urine sample to be furnished under the direct observation of a monitor and the
sample is to be collected in a medical environment, the test is reasonable).
271. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
272. Id. at 648.
273. Id. at 652.
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production of the urine sample is monitored.”274 The Court
concluded, “These conditions are nearly identical to those typically
encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and especially
schoolchildren use daily. Under such conditions, the privacy
interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample
are in our view negligible.”275 Again, this clearly demonstrates that
the Thompson court disregarded precedent when it stated that
“regardless of how [urine tests] are administered, [they] implicate
significant privacy interests.”276
In addition to the possibility of a limiting construction of the
statute regarding preservation of a urine sample, the Thompson court
could have placed a limiting construction on the method of
collection.277 While it is true that the statute must be “readily
susceptible” to such a construction, in this case the statute meets this
criterion. In both Skinner and Vernonia, the Supreme Court described
the method of collection of a urine sample and reasoned that it was
minimally intrusive.278 Given this clear precedent, and because
Minnesota courts “should interpret a statute to preserve its
constitutionality,” the Minnesota Supreme Court should have
limited the procedures by which police are allowed to request a urine
sample to minimize any intrusion on legitimate privacy interests
instead of declaring the statute unconstitutional.279
C.

The Court Gave Too Little Weight to the Public Interests Involved

In contrast, the government interest in protecting the public
from the dangers of impaired driving is significant. The Thompson
court cited Birchfield’s summation of the government interests in
protecting society from the perils of drunk driving.280 The court
274. Id. at 658.
275. Id.
276. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 231 (Minn. 2016).
277. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010) (quoting Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)) (stating that the Court may impose a limiting
construction on a statute to preserve its constitutionality if the statute is “readily
susceptible” to such a construction).
278. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
617 (1989).
279. State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2013) (quoting In re Haggerty,
448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989)).
280. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 232 (quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.
Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016)) (“[T]he Court reiterated the state and federal government’s
‘paramount interest’ in preserving public-highway safety.”).
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noted that the government has an interest both in getting impaired
drivers off the road and in deterring impaired individuals from
driving in the first place.281 The court also acknowledged the
importance of criminal penalties for test refusal because
administrative penalties are “unlikely to persuade the most
dangerous offenders.”282
After quickly summarizing the government interests, the court
noted that the reasonableness of a particular type of test depends on
the availability of alternatives.283 It noted that central to the Birchfield
holding that warrantless blood tests are unconstitutional was the
Court’s finding that, in most cases, a “less intrusive” breath test would
serve the same government interests.284 It further noted that
Birchfield held that the government “offered no satisfactory
justification for demanding the more intrusive alternative [test].”285
The Minnesota Supreme Court went one step too far. When
interpreting Birchfield it held that “[t]he State here presents no
justifications for warrantless urine tests other than those the Court
considered and rejected in Birchfield in the context of blood draws.”286
This is why the court had to find that urine testing impacted the
individual’s privacy significantly more than breath tests.
Significantly, the Supreme Court never stated that the
justifications the State offered were per se unpersuasive and never
actually “rejected” the interests asserted by the State.287 The Birchfield
Court simply held that the interests were not “satisfactory” to support
the “more intrusive” test.288 As the Thompson court admitted, “In
terms of physical intrusion, therefore, a urine test is more similar to
a breath test than a blood test.”289 Therefore, if the court had limited
the method of collection, it would have been unable to analogize the
results of Birchfield’s balancing test—in regard to blood tests—to
urine tests, as it did.290
281. Id.
282. Id. (quoting Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. (internal citations omitted).
286. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
287. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2181.
288. Id. at 2184.
289. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 230.
290. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17 (2016) (“In ascertaining the intention of the
legislature the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: . . . (3) the
legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this
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Additionally, the Thompson court erred in its balancing of the
interests involved in the case by entirely disregarding Maryland v.
King.291 The court stated that “the warrantless search in King was not
upheld as a search incident to a valid arrest, and as a result, King is
inapposite to our analysis here.”292 While some constitutional issues
are narrowly examined within different analytical frameworks,
Fourth Amendment searches are not among them.293 Beyond this
general argument, the Thompson court’s assertion is directly
contradicted by Birchfield’s use of King in its analysis.294 The Birchfield
Court compared the reasonableness of the DNA search in King to
the reasonableness of blood searches and breath searches, even
though the King decision relied on the inventory search exception
and the reasonableness of blood and breath searches were being
litigated based on the validity of the search-incident-to-arrest
exception.295
For the Thompson court to ascribe the same balance between
breath and blood to breath and urine, it needed to find that the
intrusiveness of a urine test is of the same level as a blood test. While
Skinner did not concern criminal penalties or the search-incident-toarrest exception to the warrant requirement, it is illustrative because
it is the only case in which the Supreme Court compared and
contrasted tests of breath, urine, and blood, all in the same case.296
In regard to urine tests, the Court stated,
Like breath tests, urine tests are not invasive of the body
and, under the regulations, may not be used as an occasion
for inquiring into private facts unrelated to alcohol or drug
use. We recognize, however, that the procedures for
collecting the necessary samples, which require employees
to perform an excretory function traditionally shielded by
great privacy, raise concerns not implicated by blood or
breath tests. While we would not characterize these
additional privacy concerns as minimal in most contexts,

state . . . .”); see also id. § 645.16 (“The object of all interpretation and construction
of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”).
291. See generally Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
292. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 231 n.6.
293. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (2006) (highlighting that
the “ultimate touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness).
294. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177 (citing King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969).
295. Id.
296. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
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we note that the regulations endeavor to reduce the
intrusiveness of the collection process.297
Thus, the Skinner Court implied that the privacy concerns
implicated by urine tests could be rendered “minimal” by subjecting
the collection of such samples to certain restrictions.298
The Thompson court also did not give adequate weight to the
interest that the government has in allowing warrantless urine tests
as searches incident to arrest. While the Birchfield Court did not find
that the government interest in combatting drivers under the
influence of a substance other than alcohol is sufficient to allow
warrantless blood searches, the issue of warrantless urine tests was
not before the Court. Impaired driving is a compelling issue in the
United States, and the statistics regarding drug-related car accidents
and deaths are startling:
Drugs other than alcohol (legal and illegal) are involved in
about 16% of motor vehicle crashes. Marijuana use is
increasing and 13% of nighttime, weekend drivers have
marijuana in their system. Marijuana users were about 25%
more likely to be involved in a crash than drivers with no
evidence of marijuana use . . . .299
While warrantless blood draws intrude too far into the
constitutional right to privacy for the courts to allow them
categorically, surely the less intrusive urine test, given the restrictions
that the court could have placed on the collection and retention of
samples, is justified by this compelling interest.
D.

Requiring a Warrant for Urine Tests Incident to Arrest for DWI Does
Not Serve the Purposes of the Warrant Requirement

In Birchfield, the Court emphasized the purpose of the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to ensure that the
outcome of its analysis served the intent behind the Amendment.300
It stated that the warrant requirement protects privacy in two ways:
First, [warrants] ensure that a search is not carried out
unless a neutral magistrate makes an independent
determination that there is probable cause to believe that
297. Id. (footnote omitted).
298. See id.
299. Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv
_factsheet.html (last updated Jan. 26, 2017) (footnotes omitted).
300. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2181.
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evidence will be found. Second, if the magistrate finds
probable cause, the warrant limits the intrusion on privacy
by specifying the scope of the search—that is, the area that
can be searched and the items that can be sought.301
The Court further reasoned that neither of these purposes
would be served by requiring a warrant for breath tests after an arrest
for driving while intoxicated.302 Regarding the first purpose, the
Court stated that in requesting a warrant, an officer would likely give
a somewhat standardized recitation of facts that “are largely the same
from one drunk-driving stop to the next and consist largely of the
officer’s own characterization of his or her observations . . . . A
magistrate would be in a poor position to challenge such
characterizations.”303 The second purpose of the warrant
requirement would be even less served by judicial oversight at the
time of the arrest.304 Because the permitted scope of a chemical test
would necessarily be defined by the test itself, “the warrants in
question here would not serve that function at all.”305
A warrant requirement for a urine test would not provide any
protection from a neutral magistrate because the facts requiring a
urine test would likely be the same in nearly every case. First, a police
officer would have probable cause to believe that someone was
driving while intoxicated, and either (1) the suspect would not
exhibit a significant amount of alcohol in his system, perhaps due to
an inability to take a breath test for a medical reason like asthma, or
(2) police might find drugs or paraphernalia on a person who
appeared to have been driving while impaired. Either way, as with
the breath test at issue in Birchfield, “the officer would typically recite
the same facts that led the officer to find that there was probable
cause for arrest, [which would] consist largely of the officer’s
characterization of his or her observations.” 306 The second purpose
of the warrant requirement, that the neutral magistrate can define
the scope of the search, 307 would also not be served by requiring the
301. Id. (citations omitted).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.; cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (“[I]n
light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in
those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a
neutral magistrate to evaluate.”).
306. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2181.
307. Id.
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officer to get a warrant. The scope of the search would be the same
in every case; that is to say, officers would be permitted to request
that the suspect consent to a urine test.
Requiring a warrant before a request for a chemical test would
serve to validate an officer’s determination that probable cause
exists. However, this oversight already exists because, in order to
convict an individual for DWI test-refusal, the state must prove that
the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant, thus
validating the constitutionality of the search as a search incident to
arrest. Therefore, instead of validating the search before it happens,
the court would simply require police officers to validate their
findings after the fact. Ideally, oversight by a neutral magistrate
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures while
still allowing police to get impaired drivers off of the streets. But even
if warrantless urine tests were allowed as searches incident to arrest
and a police officer unreasonably required that someone perform a
urine test after an erroneous arrest, a judge would review the
officer’s judgment and have the power to throw out the case for a
lack of probable cause.308 Further, for arrests that are clearly
erroneous, not only will the case be dismissed, but victims of
erroneous searches may be able to recover in tort for the violation of
their personal autonomy.309 Therefore, the main historical purpose
of the Fourth Amendment of protecting individuals from general
warrants that effectively had no judicial oversight is not implicated
in DWI test-refusal cases because any search under this statute must
by necessity occur after an arrest, which would later be reviewed by
a judge.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning overstated
the privacy interests implicated by urine testing and understated the
308. See State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 2001) (citing In re
Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn. 1997)) (“[W]e do conduct a de novo
review of probable cause determinations made in connection with warrantless
searches.”).
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (recognizing a cause of action for constitutional
violations); see also Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that
individuals have a right to be free from arrest absent either a valid warrant or
probable cause, and that if police violate that right, they are not entitled to qualified
immunity when their actions are objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law).
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public interests involved, the holding of the case was in error.
Further, because requiring a warrant for urine searches incident to
arrest for driving while impaired does not serve the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, the Minnesota Supreme Court erred by not
considering that purpose in its analysis. For the reasons stated above,
the Minnesota Supreme Court should reconsider its decision in a
future case, or the United States Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to address this issue.310

310. On January 13, 2017, Thompson petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Minnesota v.
Thompson, No. 16-887 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). The Supreme Court denied the petition
on March 20, 2017. Minnesota v. Thompson, 137 S. Ct. 1338 (2017).
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